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KNOWLEDGE AND UNCERTAINTY 
Henry E.  Kyburg, Jr. 
One purpose -- quite a few thinkers would say the main purpose -- of 
seeking knowledge about the world is to enhance our ability to make good 
decisions. An item of knowledge that can make no conceivable difference 
with regard to anything we might do would strike many as frivolous. 
Whether or not we want to be philosophical pragmatists in this strong 
sense with regard to everything we might want to enquire about, it seems a 
perfectly appropriate attitude to adopt toward artificial knowledge 
systems. 
If it is granted that we are ultimately concerned with decisions, 
then some constraints are imposed on our measures of uncertainty at the 
level of decision making. If our measure of uncertainty is real valued, 
then it isn't hard to show that it must satisfy the classical probability 
axioms. For example, if an act has-a-real-valued utility U(E) if event E 
obtains, and the same real-valued utility if the denial of�-obtains, -
(U(E) = U(-E)) then the expected utility of that act must be U(E), and 
that must be the same as �*�(�) + s.*�( -!), where .1?. and s represent the 
uncertainty of ! and -! respectively. But then we must have 2. + s = 1. 
1. There are reasons for rejecting real-valued -- i.e., strictly 
probabilistic -- measures of uncertainty, though not all the reasons that 
have been adduced for doing so are cogent. One is that these 
probabilities seem to embody more knowledge than they should: for 
example, if your beliefs are probabilistic, and you assign a probability 
of .01 to a drawn ball's being purple (on no evidence), and a probability 
of .02 to a second ball's being purple on the evidence that the first one 
is, and regard pairs of balls as "exchangeable", then you should be 99% 
sure that in the infinitely long run, no more than 11% of the balls will 
be purple. You know beyond a shadow of a doubt (with probability .99996) 
that no more than half will be purple. (In fact, we need much less than 
full exchangeability for this: all we need is that both individual events 
and pairs of events are treated the same way -- Kyburg, 1968.) 
Peter Cheeseman (1985) has given a defense of classical probability, 
and perhaps would not find even such results as the foregoing distasteful. 
But it is hard to see how to defend the real-valued point of view from 
charges of subjectivity. Cheeseman refers to an "ideal" observer, but 
offers us no guidance in how to approach ideality, nor any 
characterization of how the ideal observer differs from the rest of us. 
It is therefore quite unclear what the ideal observer offers us, other 
than moral support: each of us is no doubt convinced that the ideal 
observer assigns probabilities just like himself. One man's subjective 
bias is another man's rational insight. 
One defense against charges of subjectivity is to be found in the 
"convergence" theorems, of which the most famous is de Finetti's (de 
Finetti, 1937). Roughly: If � is a sequence of trials, each resulting in 
success or failure, and you and I agree that the sequence is exchangeable, 
then no matter how divergent our initial views of the probability of 
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success -- so long as they are not.given by probabilities of 0 or 1 -- and 
no matter what degree of agreement we seek, there is a number n such that 
after observing n trials you and I will agree to that degree on the 
probability of s�ccess on the next trial. 
Of course each such theorem has a less gratifying counterpart: given 
any degree of disagreement that is intolerable, and given any n, there 
exists a degree of initial disagreement such that even after n-trials our 
degree of disagreement about the probability of su�s on th; n plus 
first trial will be intolerable. And nothing precludes our disagreeing 
that much to start with . 
It could be argued -- and has been -- that subjective probabilities 
don't vary so dreadfully much, and so in fact subjectivity is a mere 
hobgoblin. It may be philosophically troubling to those of that turn of 
mind, but it is of little practical importance. 
But I think it can be argued that a small difference in some 
subjective probabilities can lead to a very large difference in others. 
Furthermore, it is well known that we all fail to conform to the 
probability calculus in our degrees of belief. That just means that we 
have to make some adjustments. Since small differences can lead to large 
ones, the particular adjustments we make can have large consequences. 
There are other ways of representing uncertainty than by real numbers 
between 0 and 1. If these uncertainties are to be used in making 
decisions, however, they must be compatible with classical point-valued 
probabilities. My preference is for intervals, because they can be based 
on objective knowledge of distributions, and because this compatibility is 
demonstrable. (Kyburg, 1974) 
In what follows, I will sketch the properties of interval-valued 
epistemic probability, and exhibit a structure for knowledge 
representation that allows for both uncertain inference from evidence and 
uncertain knowledge as a basis for decision. Along the way I make some 
comparisons to other approaches. 
2. Probability. 
Probability is a function from statements and sets of statements to 
closed subintervals of [0,1]. The sets of statemen�epresent 
hypothetical bodies of knowledge. The idea behind Prob(�,!) = [g,i] is 
that someone whose body of knowledge is ! should, ought to, have a 
'degree' of belief in � characterized by the interval [F,S]• The cash 
value of having such a 'degree' of belief is that he should not sell a 
ticket that returns to the purchaser $1.00 for less than 100� cents, and 
he should not buy such a ticket for more than lOOs cents. The relation in 
question is construed as a purely objective, logical relation . 
Every probability can be based on knowledge of statistical 
distributions or relative frequencies, since statements known to have the 
same truth value receive the same probability, and every such equivalence 
class of statements (we can show) contains some statements of the 
appropriate form. This statistical knowledge may be both uncertain and 
approximate (we may be practically sure that between 30% and 40% of the 
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balls are black), but it is objective in the sense that any two people 
having the same evidence should have the same knowledge . 
Classical point-valued probabilities constitute a special case, 
corresponding to the extreme hypothetical (and unrealistic) case in which 
K embodies exact statistical knowledge. 
The connection between statements and frequencies is given by a set 
of formal procedures for finding the right reference class for a given 
statement. The reference set may be multi-dimensional -- the set of urns, 
each paired with the set of draws made from it. It may be only 
"accidentally" related to sentence -- as when we predict the act of 
someone who makes a choice on the basis of a coin toss. What is the right 
reference class for a given statement S depends (formally and objectively) 
on what is in K, our body of knowledge.- In some cases we can implement a 
procedure for finding. the right reference class. 
It is natural to suppose that statistical knowledge in K is 
represented by the attribution to each reference set of a convex set of 
distributions -- for example we have every reason in the world to suppose 
that heads among coin-tosses in general is nearly binomial, with a 
parameter close to a half. (We have no reason to suppose that the 
parameter has the real value .49999 ••• ). Or we may have good reason to 
believe that two quantities are uncorrelated in their joint distribution. 
Or that we can rule out certain classes of extreme distributions. We can 
know of a certain bent coin that heads will be binomially distributed in 
sequences of its tosses, with a parameter £ at least equal to a half. In 
a wide range of cases of practical importance, what we can know of the set 
of distributions is that conditional independence obtains between certain 
variables. (Judea Pearl has made conditional independence the cornerstone 
of his constraint propagation approach (Pearl, 1985); conditional 
independence is what is required to warrant the use of Dempster's rule of 
combination . 
Henceforth, we assume convexity. Here are some immediate results 
(Kyburg 1961, 1974): 
(1) If Prob(�,!�) .. [£,!1.] then Prob(-�,,K) = [1-_g, l-p] . 
(2) If '""(]. & I) is in K, and Prob(�,.K) = [,£.l,_g_l] and b:.Q.Q(!,10 = [E_2,g_2] 
and Prob(!. V �) = [£,�], then there are numbers in [E_l,slJ and [_E.2,s2] 
whose sum is in [_F,�J. To see that [:p,!l] can be a proper subset of 
[pl + p2,ql + q2), consider a die that you know to be biassed toward the 
one at-the expense of the two, or toward the two at the expense of the 
one. Reasonable probability for the disjunction, "one or two" would be 
very close to 1/3, even though the reasonable probabilities for "one" and 
"two" would be significantly spread above and below 1/6 . 
(3) We can show that: given any finite set of sentences, Si, and a body 
of knowledge K, there exists a Bayesian function B, satisfying the 
classical probability axioms, such that for every-sentence� in Si, 
�(�) E Prob(�, !9. 
(4) Let KE be the body of knowledge obtained from K when evidence E is 
added t;-K. If ! is among the finite set of sentences in question� then 
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there may be no Bayesian function B satisfying both B(S)' E Prob(S,K) and 
B(S/E) E Prob(�KE): classical condftionalization is �t the only-way of 
�pdating probabilities. 
(5) The randomness relation is definable, and in fact for one kind of 
database rules for picking the right reference class have been 
implemented. 
3. Uncertain Knowledge. 
One problem that Bayesian and other approaches to uncertainty have is 
that there is no formal way of representing the acquisition of knowledge. 
We can represent the having of knowledge (by the assignment of probability 
1 to the item), but since there is no way in which P(S/E) can be 1 unless 
P(S) is already one, conditionalization doesn't get us knowledge. This 
has been noticed, of course; Cheeseman (1985, p. 1008) simply says, "A 
reasonable compromise is to treat propositions whose probability is close 
to 0 or 1 as if they are known with certainty ••• " But of course it is 
well known that this cannot be done generally: the conjunction of a 
number of certainties is a certainty, but the conjunction of a large enough 
number of certainties in Cheeseman's sense is what he would have to 
consider an impossibility! 
McCarthy and Hayes (1969) are seduced into following this primrose 
path, when they suggest (p. 489) "If 91,92, ••• ,9_!! 1- 9 is a possible 
deduction, then probably(9l), ... ,probably(9_!!) 1- probably (9) is also a 
possible deduction." This is clearly ruled out, on our scheme -- and even 
acceptable(9l), ... ,acceptable(92) t- acceptable(9) is ruled out as a 
consequent of the logical conditional. If we are to formalize uncertain 
inference at all and not merely the deductive propagation of 
probabilities, we must somehow accommodate sets of conflicting statements. 
Purely probabilistic rules of inference do this easily. 
We can accommodate Cheeseman's intuition that we should accept what 
is "practically certain" by considering two sets of sentences in the 
representation of knowledge. One of theUllie will call the evidential 
corpus, and denote by Ke; the other we will call the practical corpus, and 
denote by !E· 
We will accept a sentence into !E if and only if its lower 
probability relative to Ke is greater than �· The conjunction of two 
statements that appear in !E will also appear in!£ only if the 
conjunction itself is probable enough relative to Ke. Thus !E will not be 
deductively closed, though we can prove that if a statement S appears in 
!£, and� entails!'! may also appear there because it will-have a lower 
probability greater than that of S. This reflects a natural feature of 
human inference: we must have reason, not only to accept each premise in a 
complex argument, but to accept the conjunction of the premises, in order 
to be confident of the conclusion. 
In fact, the uncertain inference that generates !P from Ke has a 
number of the desirable features of non-monotonic inference. Add "Tweety 
is a bird" to Ke, and "Tweety is capable of flight" will appear in !P 
exactly because practically all birds fly. In addition, add "Tweety is an 
ostrich" to Ke, and "Tweety is not capable of flight" will appear in !P· 
-- ---
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In the former case, you should base your decisions on the assumption that 
Tweety can fly; in the latter, you no longer need worry about that 
possibility. 
But to warrant the detachment that yields the addition of a sentence 
to our stock of practical certainties, we need more than a mere 
preponderance of evidence. We don't want to infer that two tosses of a 
coin will yield one head and one tail just because this is the most likely 
outcome. Similarly, we don't want to infer that a die will not yield a 
six: we want to say that the probability of an outcome other than a six is 
about five sixths. 
This is just to say that the level of practical certainty � is 
exactly what distinguishes (in a given context) sentences that we are 
willing to bet against from sentences that we take for granted. 
We have a picture that looks like this: 
******** 
* * 
* Ke * 
******** 
******** 
* * 
* � * 
******** 
Uncertain inference: ! � !£ iff 
Prob(�,ke) z � · 
It is relative to �' the practical corpus, that we make our 
(practical) decisions. It is thus the (convex sets of) distributions 
including conditional distributions -- embodied in the practical corpus 
that we use in our decision theory. 
But there are questions. What is the value of � that we are taking 
as practical certainty? How do statements get in Ke? What is the 
decision theory that goes with this kind of structure? 
Let us first consider the value of �· Suppose the widest range of 
stakes we can come up with is 99:1. For example, Sam and Sally are going 
to bet on some event, each has $100, and neither has any change. Then a 
probability value falling outside the range of [.01,.99] would be useless 
as a betting guide. A probability less than .01 would (in this context) 
amount to a practical impossibility; one greater than .99 would amount to 
a practical certainty. 
The range of stakes can determine the level of ''practical certaintf' 
�· What counts as practical certainty depends on context, but in an 
explicit way: it depends on what's  at stake. 
How do statements qualify as evidence in Ke? Not by being "certain." 
It can be argued that anything that was really:incorrigible would have to 
be devoid of empirical content. (The worry about uncertain evidence is 
not misplaced; it's just misconstrued.) One typical form of evidence 
statement is this: ''The length of x is £ .!. .!: meters". Whatever our 
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readings, these statements are not "certain" -- they admit of error. The 
same is true of all ordinary observation statements. 
So a statement gets into Ke by having a low probability of being in 
error; equally, by having a high probability (at least e) of being 
veridical. How high? In virtue of the fact that conjunctions of pairs of 
statements in Ke appear in !£, it seems plausible to take � = (£)172. For 
a number of technical reasons (Kyburg, 1984) it turns out to be best to 
construe the corpus containing the theory of error as metalinguistic. 
This is as one might think: after all, the theory of error concerns the 
relation between readings -- e.g. numerals written in laboratory books -­
and values: the real quantities characterizing things in the real world. 
For present purposes we need note only that this is not the beginning of 
an infinite regress. We can maintain objectivity; we can avoid 
"presuppositions" and other unjustified assumptions. --
4 .  Decision. 
It has been objected (Seidenfeld, 1979) that there is no decision 
theory that is tailored to Shafer's theory of evidential support. Indeed, 
it is pretty clear that support functions alone would conflict with 
expected utility. On the other hand, since Shafer's system of support 
functions is a special case of the representation by convex sets of 
distributions, we can have very nearly a normal decision theory using 
Shafer's system. In computing the value of an act, we need to consider 
not only the support assigned to various states of affairs (corresponding 
to lower probabilities), but also the plausibilities -- corresponding to 
the upper probabilities. )  
This is true for the more general convex set representation: We can 
construct an interval of expected utility for each act. A natural 
reinterpretation of the principle of dominance would take an alternative 
al to dominate an alternative a2 whenever, for every possible frequency 
distribution, the expectation of �1 is greater than the expectation of �2. 
This eliminates some alternatives, but in general there will be a 
number of courses of action that are not eliminated. What we do here is 
another matter, one which is certainly worthy of further study. But it 
seems natural that minimax and minimax regret strategies are appropriate 
candidates for consideration under some conditions. There may well be 
others, such as satisficing. And it may even by that the guidance 
provided by the motto: eliminate dominated alternatives, is as far as 
rationality alone takes us. Further pruning may depend on constraints 
that are local to the individual decision problems. 
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